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In a model of a representative democracy, we incorporate into the analysis of 
tax design the constitutional provision that allows voters to propose tax 
initiatives. In this paper, we present a theory of tax substitution as the 
rationale for a tax rate limit (TRL) initiative. In our model the tax system at 
the status quo is determined by the electoral competition between parties. 
This political institution aggregates the voters’ preferences for tax policy 
according to the voters’ marginal proportion of the expected vote that 
different coalition of voters can deliver in the election. The approval of a 
TRL, however, depends on the majority rule, and it aggregates the 
preferences of the median voter of tax initiatives. Thus, a TRL is the result of 
two political institutions with different mechanisms to aggregate the 
preferences of voters. Moreover, our paper distinguishes the role of perfect 
and imperfect information on the distribution of voters´ preferences for tax 
systems in approving a tax initiative. In this paper we identify conditions on 
the distribution of preferences and income of the electorate and the median 
voter that guarantee the approval (rejection) of tax initiatives. 
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En un modelo de una democracia representativa incorporamos, en el análisis 
del diseño de impuestos, la provisión constitucional que permite a los 
ciudadanos proponer iniciativas de impuestos. En este artículo presentamos 
una teoría de sustitución de impuestos que explica la propuesta y aprobación 
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de una iniciativa de los ciudadanos que buscan limitar los impuestos. En 
nuestro modelo, el sistema impositivo en el estatus quo es determinado por 
la competencia electoral entre partidos. Esta institución política agrega las 
preferencias de los votantes por las políticas de impuestos de acuerdo a la 
proporción marginal de votos que las diferentes coaliciones de votantes 
pueden entregar en la elección. Sin embargo, la aprobación de una iniciativa 
que busca limitar los impuestos, depende de la regla de la mayoría, la cual 
agrega sólo las preferencias del votante mediano. Por ello, una iniciativa 
para limitar los impuestos puede ser el resultado de la interacción de dos 
instituciones políticas con diferentes mecanismos para agregar las 
preferencias de los votantes. Además, nuestro artículo distingue el papel que 
juega la información perfecta e imperfecta sobre la distribución de las 
preferencias de los votantes por los impuestos en la aprobación de una 
iniciativa de impuestos. En este artículo identificamos condiciones en la 
distribución de preferencias e ingreso del electorado y del votante mediano 
que garantizan la aprobación (el rechazo) de una iniciativa de impuestos. 
 
Palabras Claves: impuestos, limitaciones a los impuestos, efectos 
redistributivos, estructura y alcance del gobierno. 





In the last decades there has been a growing interest in the literature of 
public economics to study the influence of different political institutions in 
the design of the government´s spending and taxation, see Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962), Alesina and Roshental (1995), and Persson and Tabellini 
(2005) among many others. In particular, economists have been paying 
attention to the impact of political institutions in the way policy makers 
aggregate the heterogeneous preferences of individuals over fiscal policies. 
The problem of preference aggregation is in turn central in explaining the 
core issues of public economics such as the tradeoff between redistribution 
and efficiency in tax policy design, and the size and composition of public 
spending. Moreover, it should be clear that the way in which the individuals´ 
preferences are represented into fiscal policies is also important to explain 
the perceived legitimacy and welfare properties of the government´s fiscal 
policies. 
 
In this paper we are interested in the interaction between two specific 
political institutions: the first institution is the electoral competition to form a 
government in a representative democracy. In such economy, voters delegate 
the responsibility of designing and implementing tax policies to bureaucrats 
or representatives selected in an election. The second institution is the Political Institutions and Tax Rate Initiatives 
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process of initiatives and the direct voting of policies. In this setting, 
ordinary individuals (and not only the government´s officials) can propose 
tax initiatives that are voted in a ballot by the electorate. If an initiative 
receives the support of a majority then the initiative is turned into law and 
then implemented. 
 
The interaction between the direct voting for policies versus voting for 
representatives in the analysis of tax design is interesting for several reasons: 
First, our model is relevant to explain the design of fiscal policy in many 
countries since tax and spending policies reflect the interaction between the 
executive and the legislative powers. While in a representative democracy 
the executive power might respond to the electoral incentives of a 
nationwide election, the legislative bargaining is widely regarded as a direct 
voting mechanism for choosing tax and spending policies, see Austen-Smith 
(2000), Baron and Ferejohn (1989), and Denzau et al (1979).
2 Second, even 
in democracies in which there is party control, the interaction between direct 
and representative voting is empirically relevant.
3 Several countries, such as 
the United States and Switzerland, use both institutions to design public 
policies. 
 
The interaction between the direct voting for policies versus voting for 
representatives discussed above represents the actual political institutions in 
place for twenty three states in the U.S.
4 The use of tax initiatives at the local 
level in the U.S. has been intense in the last decades. According to a report in 
1995 by the U.S. Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations 
(ACIR), by 1995 forty six states in the U.S approved some sort of tax 
initiatives known as tax and expenditure limitations (TELs). The 
predominant form of these tax initiatives were tax rate limits (voters sought 
to constraint the level of a tax rate that the government could implement), 
and local governments in thirty three states were affected by overall and/or 
specific tax rate limits.
5  
 
Even when many of the tax and spending initiatives approved in the last 
decades aimed to constraint or reduce the size of local and state 
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4 In these states voters can vote not only for representatives but also for tax and spending 
initiatives that are proposed by a coalition of citizens. 
5 See U.S Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations (1995). Ensayos 
 
68 
governments, the ACIR (1995) reports that TELs did not affect the size of 
the government but changed the composition of state and local spending.
6 
Empirical evidence also suggests that TELs modified the structure of state 
and local tax systems, see ACIR (1995), Joyce and Mullins (1991), Fisher 
and Gade (1991), Shadbegian (1999), Preston and Ichniowski (1991), Dye 
and McGuire (1997), and Skidmore (1999). Finally, the evidence indicates 
that TELs are long lived tax amendments see ACIR (1995), and Shadbegian 
(1999).  To sum up, TELs are a widespread phenomenon affecting state and 
local spending and tax structures, tax rate limits are the predominant form of 
tax initiatives, and TELs are long lived tax amendments. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the influence on tax design of the 
constitutional provision that allows voters to vote jointly for representatives 
and tax initiatives. The problem of tax policy design is at the core of the 
theory of public economics and it has received a great deal of attention (for a 
survey of the theory of the design of tax structure see Auerbach and Hines 
2002, and Hettich and Winer 1999).  
  
To be more specific, in this paper we are interested in examining why a tax 
rate limit (TRL) initiative is placed on the ballot, and what explains the 
approval (rejection) of a TRL. Our paper seeks to provide insights on why 
voters might choose to constrain themselves by imposing a tax rate or 
spending limit on the government when they can remove an official out of 
office if he spends too much or makes other decisions that displease them 
(for a discussion along these lines see Husted and Kenny 2007).  
 
In addition, we seek to explain some stylized facts. That is, why a majority 
of voters would approve a TEL even when the analysis of Attiyeh and Engle 
(1979), Citrin (1979), and Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1980) suggest 
that voters were in general satisfied with the spending of the government. 
This evidence suggests that voters might not seek to reduce spending, but 
they might have a different rationale for a tax rate initiative such as a change 
in the tax structure that could modify the distribution of tax burdens. 
 
In this paper we develop a probabilistic model of electoral competition to 
analyze the tax policies proposed by parties in a representative economy. 
However, in our economy ordinary citizens can propose tax initiatives. The 
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polity uses the majority rule to approve a tax initiative.
7 We use this 
framework to argue that the electoral competition between parties 
determines the tax system at the status quo by aggregating the voters’ 
preferences for tax policy in a different way the majority rule aggregates the 
voters’ interests. In our analysis, the electoral competition aggregates the 
preferences of the whole electorate over policy while the majority rule (the 
institution that dictates if a tax initiative is approved or rejected) aggregates 
the preferences of the median voter of the tax initiatives.  
 
For this reason, the tax structure at the electoral competition might be 
different to the ideal tax structure of the median voter. This, in turn, may 
explain why the median voter might approve an initiative to constraint a tax 
rate. The approval of the tax amendment, however, does not necessarily 
imply that voters are unsatisfied with the size of the budget or that voters 
question the efficiency of the government to transform public revenues into 
services (these two arguments have dominated the discussion of the rationale 
for a tax rate limit). Therefore, in this paper we provide a different rationale 
for the approval (rejection) of tax rate initiatives. In particular, we argue that 
the rationale for a TRL proposal is to substitute feasible tax structures rather 
than to constraint the government’s power to collect taxes (or equivalently in 
this paper, the size of the government). Finally, we provide a model that 
predicts the tax structure that would arise as a result of a TRL.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: In section I, we review the literature on 
tax initiatives known as tax and expenditure limitations. Section II considers 
the behavior of voters and the equilibrium derived from the political 
competition in this economy. The preferences of voters over tax instruments 
and the option of a tax rate limit are studied in section III. Section IV 
includes a discussion section. The last section concludes. 
 
 
1. Stylized Facts and the Literature Review on Tax and Expenditure 
Limitations 
 
The literature on TELs has centered on explaining why the government does 
not provide the fiscal policies demanded by the median voter, see Shapiro, et 
al (1979). The celebrated model of electoral competition under perfect 
information on the distribution of voters´ preferences, the model of Downs 
(1957), can not rationalize why a tax initiative is approved. This result 
follows from the fact that the Downs´ model predicts that the tax policy at 
the political equilibrium produces the ideal policy of the median voter. For 
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this reason, the median voter would not approve a tax initiative to control the 
power of a government that seeks to maximize his utility. 
 
In fact, Denzau, Mackay and Weaver (1979) y Denzau y Mackay (1980) 
depict a TEL as a mechanism to restore the median voter outcome (MVO). 
They argue that the MVO can be upset by a group of high demanders with 
the power to control the agenda. In their model of legislative bargaining, a 
representative can control the agenda to produce a size of government that is 
higher than that desired by the median voter. For this reason, the median 
voter might approve a tax initiative that seeks to control the size of the 
government.  
 
The apparent inability of the median voter model to explain the approval of 
tax and expenditure initiatives persuaded Brennan and Buchannan (1978a, 
1978b, 1980) to provide a model in which a dictator rules the government. In 
their framework, the dictator has incentives to maximize the public budget. 
In addition, the dictator is not constrained by electoral considerations which 
leads to the obvious result of a big government.
8 In this case, dissatisfied 
citizens seek to limit the power of a government that maximizes the 
“Leviathan”, by approving a proposal that effectively constraints the 
government’s capacity to collect taxes. 
 
Two observations are worth to be noticed on the hypothesis that the 
objective of a TRL is to control the government’s spending or its capacity to 
collect taxes. First, as Brennan and Buchanan (1978b) recognize, an isolated 
tax rate limitation is unlikely to constraint the government’s capacity to raise 
public revenue. Thus, in the context of a Leviatan government, what is the 
rationale for a single tax rate limit?  
 
Second, in the light of an important expansion of the public sector after the 
50’s, the explanation of a big government as the rationale of a TEL seems 
appealing. However, Attiyeh and Engle (1979), Citrin (1979), Courant, 
Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1980), and Ladd and Wilson (1982) use survey 
techniques to reveal that voters were in general satisfied with the 
government’s expenditure. This finding led Ladd and Wilson (1982) to argue 
that the approval of a TEL initiative (in particular the Massachusetts’ 
proposition 21/2) was more an attempt to reduce tax burdens and obtain 
higher efficiency from the government rather than to reduce spending.  
 
Courant and Rubinfeld (1981) provide a model in which the government’s 
services are inefficient since public employees have monopolistic power in 
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setting public wages. In this setting, a coalition of voters seeks to increase 
their well being by limiting the public budget. However, the voters’ approval 
of a budget limit requires that voters expect that public employees, in their 
self interest, reduce their wages after the budget limit is approved. In the 
model, however, the mechanisms that explain how public employees 
respond to a budget limit and the voters’ system of beliefs on the response of 
public employees are exogenous. For this reason, it is not clear why voters 
would approve a budget limitation. 
 
In summary, tax initiatives have been regarded as a mechanism of voters to 
impose a non electoral control over a big government, as an attempt to 
improve the efficiency of the government, and as a way to restore the median 
voter outcome that was initially upset by a group of high demanders with the 
power to control the agenda. Other explanations for TELs proposed in 
empirical analysis include: Tax initiatives might be explained as the voters’ 
attempt to change the composition of tax collections and reduce tax 
burdens.
9  However, to the best of my knowledge, no formal argument has 
been provided to show that some of the claims in the empirical analysis 
surveyed above can be characterized through the existing bureaucratic and/or 
political models. 
 
Although we have learned a great deal from the models surveyed above, 
there are several elements that can explain the proposal-approval of TRLs 
that have received little attention: first, the role of preference aggregation in 
determining tax policy, and second, in the context of uncertainty, the 
government’s tax policy at the electoral equilibrium might not be the ideal 
tax policy of the median voter. To see the latter point, note that a party could 
choose a policy that fails to represent the preferences of a majority if parties 
have imperfect information on the actual ideal policies of voters.  
 
If Downsian parties know with certainty that a policy is a Condorcet winner 
then parties’ dominant strategy is to choose such a policy.
10 Still, a 
Condorcet winner might exist but such a policy could be unknown for 
parties. Thus, the objective of the paper is to incorporate a model of 
imperfect information on the distribution of voters´ preferences to study the 
                                                 
9 See also Alm and Skidmore (1999) for an excellent review of previous works and for an 
alternative hypothesis on the partisan composition of the legislature as a source of possible 
deviations of the median voter outcome. 
10 A Condorcet winner is a policy that provides a probability of winning the election that is 
no less than ½. An alternative interpretation is that a Condorcet winner is a policy that 
beats any other alternative by majority.  Roemer (2001), Coughlin (1992),  and many 
others, show that proposing a policy that is a Condorcet winner (if such a policy exists) is 
a dominant strategy for Downsian parties. Ensayos 
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interaction between political institutions related with a representative and a 
direct democracy.  
 
Our model is also different in another dimension to the existing literature. 
While the literature has focused on the hypothesis that tax initiatives seek to 
control the size of spending of the government, in our analysis voters 
disagree on the tax structure that seeks to finance the government´s services. 
This characterization allows us to show that a tax rate initiative can be 
approved to change the distribution of the tax burdens rather than to 
constraint the size of the government. Thus, our model can rationalize the 
empirical findings that suggest that the voter´s tax and spending initiatives 
did not reduce the size of government but changed the tax structure of state 
and local governments. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
The economy is constituted by voters indexed by  H h ,... 2 , 1 = . Voters 
engage in several types of activities: They vote for a candidate (party) 
representing the government or directly over tax policies. They can propose 
tax initiatives, and lastly, they select their consumption bundle. Evidence 
suggests that the individuals’ choice of a vote for a representative reflects a 
complex calculus of, among other things, voters’ preferences over policies, 
candidates’ attributes, partisanship, and a retrospective evaluation of the 
candidates’ performance in office, see Fiorina (1997). For simplicity, we 
assume the individuals’ choice of the vote depends only on tax policy issues. 
We denote a voting choice set  h Cs   h ∀  that records the party receiving the 
vote from the individual h. Thus, a voter h votes for party k  if: 
 
h kC s ∈   ⇔    ( ) ( ) { }   0        ≥ − ∀ =
− − k k h k hk h h Cs t t υ υ                                (1) 
 
Where  ()
hk k υ t  and  ( )
, hk k υ
−− t  are the indirect utility functions for individual 
h when parties k and –k propose tax policies  k t  and  k − t . The indirect utility 








⎧ ≤ =      : s.t.        
 
h h k h h k hk e Max
h x q x t
x
μ υ   H h ....... 2 , 1   = ∀                               (2) 
 
The expression in (2) defines the preference ordering over feasible policies 
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k tPolitical Institutions and Tax Rate Initiatives 
 
73 
commodities. The consumer’s price vector is  kk q= p + t;  p  is the vector of 
the producers’ prices, and  k t  is the vector of commodity taxes proposed by 
party k. The supply of private commodity i  is perfectly elastic at  i p, and for 
simplicity we normalize  1 = i p ∀ 1, 2.... in =  commodities. From the budget 
constraint, 
h e  as the voter’s endowment. 
 
In this economy two parties compete for votes by designing the tax structure 
that raises an amount of public revenue  R  (assumed to be exogenously 
given). Note that by assuming parties seek to collect the public revenue  R , 
our analysis about the rationale of tax initiatives will hold for any size of the 
government (because the value of  R  can be set as high, or as low, as we 
consider appropriate). 
 
As opposed to the literature that studies on the size of the government, our 
analysis is focused on the fact that the heterogeneity of preferences and 
endowments of voters leads to a social choice problem defined by the type of 
tax structure that collects public revenue  R . A voter h who consumes more 
of commodity i relative his consumption on commodity j would prefer a tax 
structure that relies heavily on a high tax on commodity j relative the tax on 
commodity i. The reason is simple, such a tax system would miminize the 
tax burden of voter h while at the same time would collect the public revenue 
R . The problem of preference aggregation for parties is that candidates 
need to use an electoral measure to weigh the conflictive interests of voters 
over taxes and design a tax system that maximizes the votes that parties 
expect to receive in the election.
11 
 
The strategy space for candidates  { } , ck k = − is  { }
c c S t   = , and it is assumed 
to be a convex, closed and bounded set representing the taxes that raise a 
public revenue  R . For the purpose of analyzing the design of tax policies 
we assume candidates are uncertain on how the tax policies proposed by 
parties  k and –k will be translated into votes. From the candidates’ 
perspective, their system of beliefs on the individual´s voting behavior 
corresponds to a common cumulative distribution function,  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ hk F , over 
the set of voters’ preferences over taxes proposed by parties, 
( ) ( )
k k h k hk hk − − − = Ψ t t
, υ υ , where 
hk Ψ  is the welfare gain (loss) of voting for 
                                                 
11 In the models of electoral competition parties and candidates represent a united team. In 
this paper we will use the words parties or candidates as we considered convenient. Ensayos 
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party k instead of party  k − .  In other words, given the parties´ tax policies 
k t  and 
k − t , the probability that an individual h votes for party k is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
k k h k hk hk hk F
− − − = t t
, Pr υ υ                                                                          (3) 
 
Let the proportion of voters with endowment  h e  be given by 
1 : = ∑∀h
h h ϕ ϕ . The expected proportion of the vote for party k  is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
∀
− − − − =
h
k k h k hk hk h k k k F EV t t t t
, , υ υ ϕ , and the party’s plurality is 
( ) ( )
k k k k k k k EV EV P
− − − − = t t t t , , A . In this economy all voters vote therefore
1 = + −k k EV EV ; A party k wins the election if  0 >
k PA . The objective of party 
k can be re-written as  ( ) 1 , 2 − = −k k k k EV P t t A . Under our assumptions, to 
maximize the expected proportion of votes is equivalent to maximize the 
expected proportion of the party´s plurality. Hence, the objective of party k 
can be stated as: 
 


















k k h k hk hk h k k k





,        s.t.  
,    
t




                        (4) 
 
In (4) the aimed public revenue  R
 




k k t t ,....   1
* = t  over the Marshallian demand functions 
() H h i e x
h k h
i ,... 1   ,    , = ∀ ∀ t . The assumption that the government uses a 
commodity tax structure is made for simplicity. However, this assumption is 
empirically relevant and common in the literature of taxation see for 
instance, among many others, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972), and more 
recently Sheshinski (2007). The analysis of a mixed tax structure will be the 
subject of future research. 
 
Let the expected proportion of votes over the constrained policy space be 
concave on taxes.
12 The electoral game is characterized by 
                                                 
12 This assumption requires that the expected proportion of votes for the party over the 
constrained policy space, ( ) c
k k c ∀
−   ,t t δ , be concave on taxes. The constrained indirect 
utility function for any party k,  ( )
k k k − t t , δ , is given by 























k k h k hk hk h k k k e x t R ξ F
1 1
,   ,     , t t t t t ϕ υ υ ϕ δ
where 
k ξ  is the Langrange 





k k k ∀ ∀ ≤ ∂ ∂
− ,     0 ,
2 , 2 t t δ . In this paper we assume this condition holds. For more Political Institutions and Tax Rate Initiatives 
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{} { } {}   ,   , , , ,  
* * c
h
hc l c k k v
h
h EC EV S S Cs ∀
−
∀ Θ ∈ ∈ ∈ = Γ υ ϕ t t  where the 
strategy set 










1   = υ  for  { } , ck k =− , and the candidates’ payoff is the expected proportion 
of the vote in the election 
c EV for  { } , ck k = − . Finally, the strategy policy 
space is  c k k S ∈




3. The Political Equilibrium and the Parties´ Tax Platforms  
 
In this section we propose a dynamic game to analyze the proposal and 
approval (rejection) of tax initiatives, and the effect of the voters’ initiatives 
on the government´s tax structure. In the first stage of the game, see figure 1, 
parties k and –k  propose  k * t  and  k − * t . In the second stage, voters observe 
the parties’ proposals and vote according to their preferences to elect a 
public official. The voters will cast a vote for the party that advances a tax 
system that is closest to the voter´s own preferences over the tax system that 
collects  R . At the end of the second stage a representative, or bureaucrat, is 
chosen by majority and forms the government. 
 
In the third stage, voters can propose tax initiatives. After observing the 
initiatives advanced by the coalitions of voters, the polity chooses by 
majority rule if an initiative is approved. We assume it is costless to propose 
tax initiatives. To guarantee a majoritarian equilibrium for the process of 
selecting tax initiatives, we assume that individuals are allowed to propose 
tax rate limits only over  i t  (the tax over commodity i).  
 
Figure 1 




                                                                                                          




Voters can propose and 
approve (reject) tax 
initiatives
The elected party implements
The tax structure that satisfies 
the objective of the collective 
action conditioned by re-
election concerns and by  a 








The approval (rejection) of a tax rate limit should be related with the voters’ 
system of beliefs on the response of the government to a tax rate initiative.
13 
That is, from the point of view of rational voters, the approval (rejection) of 
a tax motion requires the comparison of the ex-ante tax structure versus the 
tax system that would arise as a result of a TRL. Therefore, in the fourth 
stage the elected candidate, say from party k, within the context of the 
electoral competition and conditioned to a tax rate limit (if any is approved) 





k k t t t , , , , , , ., 1 = t . If a tax rate limit is not 
approved by majority in the third stage of the game then the elected party 
implements  k * t . It follows that in the third stage of the game the median 
voter compares  k t  versus  k * t . 
 
In this paper we consider the case in which the tax structure is defined by 
two tax instruments 
k




that raise the public revenue R . Suppose a 
tax rate limitation is considered to be placed on the ballot with a proposal of 
fixing  *
iii ttt =<. Note that the tax structure can be defined as a one 














, ,    : ,   t ϕ  
j i j t t t → ∃ :   
 
such that  ( ) ( ) ( ) , iji i R Rtt t Rt == . Moreover, the voters’ 
preferences over tax policy are single peaked.
14 By the result of the median 
voter theorem, for a proof see Black (1948) and Mueller (2003), a Condorcet 
winner will be chosen in the third stage of the game.
15 
 
In this case, the median voter selects the feasible tax amendment that induces 
the maximum difference between the utility level set from the (ex-post) 
constrained tax structure, and the utility derived from the tax system 
proposed by parties in the second stage of the game. In other words, the 
median voter selects  *
iii ttt = ≤  such that 
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,      ,         s.t.
       ,   ,   max arg
t ϕ
υ υ χ
                              (5) 
                                                 
13 That is, rational voters incorporates that a TRL imposes a constraint only in one of the 
tax instruments available to the government. Tax authorities might respond to a TRL by 
increasing the non-constrained tax instruments. 
14 This follows by the assumption that the indirect utilities of voters over the constrained 
tax policy space are concave on taxes. 
15 A Condorcet winner is a policy that beats any other alternative by a majority of the 




In equation (5) the median voter recognizes that the government will respond 
by changing the non-constrained tax instruments to satisfy the tax revenue 
objective  R . This is represented in the restriction (a) by the expected 
reaction function of the government  ( ) i j j t t t = . Clearly, a tax rate limit will 
be approved if  
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  0   must hold in the event a tax 
rate limit is approved by majority.
16  
 
In our economy, a proposal for a TRL is placed on the ballot by a coalition 
of voters who seek to obtain a tax structure that is closer to their most 
preferred feasible tax policy. A TRL will be approved if the marginal rate of 
tax substitution of the median voter 
0 = − mv d i j dt dt
υ  (defined as the rate at 
which changes in the tax structure leads to a constant utility for the voter) is 
at least as high as the parties’ reaction functions
0 = −
R d i j dt dt  (or changes in 
the non constrained tax instruments as a result of the approval of a TRL). 
The intuition behind of this result is simple: when condition (5´) is satisfied 
with the inequality, the median voter changes the distribution of tax burdens 
such that the government keeps collecting the same amount of public 
revenue  R , but with the tax system resulting from the voters´ initiatives the 
tax burden of the median voter is lower. 
 
                                                 
16 Condition (5´) is derived as follows: Calculate 
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Proposition 1 The political equilibrium for this economy is constituted as 
follows: In the first stage of the game, parties propose a tax structure  * t  
that maximizes the parties´ expected proportion of the votes in the election. 
In the second stage, citizens choose a party in the election.  In the third 
stage, voters observe the results of the election and consider to propose (or 
not) a tax initiative. After observing the set of tax initiatives (if any), the 
proposed tax initiatives are evaluated by the electorate through a set of pair 
wise comparisons. If a tax initiative beats any other alternative by a simple 
majority, then the winning tax initiative is implemented. In this case, in the 
fourth stage of the game, parties choose the rest of taxes that are not subject 
to a limitation. If there is no Condorcet winner in the set of tax initiatives, 
then the policy   proposed by the party in the first stage of the game is 
implemented. Formally the political equilibrium is: 
 
I. In the first stage parties select  * t :
17 
() ( ) ()
() {}   ,   ,    : s.t
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II. In the second stage of the game, voters vote for a party in the election 
such that 
h Cs k k ∈ − ∨      ⇔    ( ) ( ) { }         
k k h k hk h h Cs
− − − ∀ = t t υ υ  
And a representative is elected. 
 
III. In the third stage, there exists voters who propose initiatives  h t h
i        ∀ : 
( ) ( ) ( ) { }         ,   ,   max arg
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IV. The median voter approves a tax rate limit  *
iii ttt ≤ <  such that 
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17 The notation means that if a party is denoted      ,  then the other party is denoted  
–    . 
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V. In the fourth stage of the game, parties respond to a tax rate limit (if any 
is approved) by selecting  ( ) i j t t  such that  ( ) [ ]     ,   i j i t t t = t  where
18 
() () ( ) () ∑
=
− − − ∈
H
h
c h c h c hc hc h
i j F t t
1
, ,   max arg   t t υ υ ϕ  
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If a tax rate initiative is not approved by the median voter then parties 
implement  .
* t  
 
It should be clear that the strategies I to V are weakly dominant strategies, 
and hence there are no profitable deviations from the prescribed strategies in 
proposition 1. However, it is instructive to analyze here whether parties 
select tax policies that maximize the expected proportion of the vote in the 
second stage, or alternatively, select tax policies to avoid the approval of any 
tax rate initiative in the third stage of the game. To see that the tax strategies 
in I belong to the subgame pefect Nash equilibrium, consider an alternative 
strategy in which parties select a tax structure that seeks to maximize their 
chances of winning the election, and simultaneously minimize the possibility 
that a TRL is approved in the third stage of the game. 
 
Our argument is that parties have no incentives to adopt the latter strategy. 
This conclusion follows by the simple recognition that adding constraints to 
the parties´ tax design problem leads to lower (or at most to the same) 
plurality that the parties can achieve over a less constrained policy space (the 
strategy prescribed in I). Since the prospect of winning the election for each 
party depends on how tax policy platforms are translated into votes, then 
parties have no incentives to constraint their policy space, and therefore, 
their chances of winning the election. This doesn’t mean that parties will 
propose any policy; parties maximize their chances of winning the election if 
parties propose a tax policy that weighs the voters’ demands for tax structure 
according to the voters’ marginal proportion of the expected vote (see a 
proof of this argument in proposition 2). Any deviation from this strategy 
hurts the parties’ chances of winning the election in the second stage of the 
game. 
 
We proceed to show this result and to characterize the tax structure resulting 
from the parties´ electoral competition in the second stage of the game. 
 
                                                 
18 In this paper we ignore the information that the process of direct voting provides to 
parties about the true distribution of voter´s preferences over tax policies. Ponce (2007) 
has provided a model along these lines in which the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium leads to 
an updating process over the systems of beliefs over the distribution of preferences. Ensayos 
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Proposition 2 In the second stage of the game, parties converge in proposing 
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Proof 
The first order conditions for the problem of tax policy design for any party k  
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In condition (7)  0 <
k ξ is the marginal proportion of the expected votes lost 




From the optimal choice of consumption of any voter h it is satisfied that the 
vector of Marshallian demands 
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{} ( ) { }      : s.t           max arg ,    
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∂
   0   . For this reason condition (7) becomes 
 
                                                 
19  Recall that the parties´ tax design problem is to choose  i t
k
i ∀ ,
*  to maximize 
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1 1
,   ,     , t t t t t ϕ υ υ ϕ δ  
where 
k ξ  is the Langrange multiplier of the public revenue constraint of the government. 
The first order conditions in (7) are  ( ) i   t
k
i
k k k ∀ = ∂ ∂
−   0 ,
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It is well known that  () 0   ,   ≤ − =
∂









υ  where 
h α is the marginal 
utility of income for individual h. Using the last condition and the expression 
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Since parties share a common system of beliefs over voting behavior, that is 
since ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
k h k h k h k h k h hk f f t t t t υ υ υ υ − = −
− − − ,  for  ( ) ( )
k h k h − = t t υ υ , and 
candidates are not otherwise differentiated, then parties converge in their tax 
platforms and select 
* *, * t t t = =
−k k (for a formal proof of this result see 
Coughlin 1992). It follows,  ( ) ( )
k h k h − =
* * t t υ υ  implies  ( ) ( ) h c f f
k h hk ∀ = =
−    0 0
,  
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In condition (6), the design of taxes is explained by political incentives to 
redistribute tax burdens, and the political costs from the deadweight costs of 
taxation.
20 Proposition 2 provides a characterization of the tax rate for 
                                                 
20 Taxes distort relative prices of commodities which, in turn, distort the consumer´s 
choices. These deadweights costs of taxation are given by the changes in consumption of 
individuals tracked by the compensated (Hicksian) demands that can be calculated by the 
Slutsky equation. In the first order conditions of  (7), the political costs from the Ensayos 
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* * 1   + , that depends on the pattern of consumption 
over commodities, and the distribution of the marginal utility of income 
across voters. 
 












































= . Thus, 
h
i s  is the share of consumption of individual h in 
good i in relation to the market.
21 At the political equilibrium the tax rate on 
commodity  i will be lower the higher is the weighted average share of 








α ϕ , the higher is the 
marginal probability that voters vote for party k in the election  () 0
hk f , and 
the higher is the marginal proportion of the expected votes lost when the 
party relaxes (increases) the public budget constraint of the government R  
(the more negative is  0 <
k ξ ). 
As mentioned before, parties have incentives to redistribute tax burdens to 
minimize political opposition for tax structures in the election. To see this, 
consider a politically optimal two commodity tax structure 





c − = ∀ = ,       ,  
* * * t . Each tax rate is characterized by condition 




* * >  in their tax structure because the 
distribution of preferences and incomes of voters is such that the weighted 
average share of consumption on commodity i is lower relative than that of 
commodity j. Formally,  
 
                                                                                                          






























* ϕ ξ  , 
where  k ξ  is the marginal proportion of the expected votes lost when the party relaxes the 
public budget constraint R . 
21 To see this, note that dividing the numerator and the denominator of (6) by ( )
k
i t + 1 , we 
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3.1 Direct Voting over Taxes and the Option of a Tax Rate Limit 
 
In this section we analyze the proposal and approval of tax initiatives. As 
mentioned before, after observing the tax platforms of parties in the third 
stage of the game, voters might propose tax initiatives.  If a tax rate 
limitation is approved by majority, then the tax rate initiative over 
commodity i, say i t   , reflects the ideal deviation of the median voter over the 





c − = ∀ = ,      ,  
* * * t  
such that
( ) () ( ) {} ( ) R t t t i) t t t t t t i j i j i
mv
i j i i
mv ∈ − ∈    ,    s.t        ,   ,   max arg   
* * υ υ ,  where 
() () i j i t t t
mv , υ  are the preferences of the median voter over taxes, and  () i j t t  
is the parties´ response function to a tax rate limitation in the fourth stage of 
the game. Finally, because  ( )
* *, j i t t
mv υ  is given in the third stage of the game 
then  i t    is the ideal tax over commodity i of the median voter since  i t    also 
satisfies ( ) ( ) ( ) { }      , s.t        ,   max arg    R t t t t t t t i j i i j i i
mv ∈ ∈ υ . 
 
It is relevant to point out that in this paper the decision over which type of 
tax instrument to limit is exogenous. This assumption is justified by 
simplicity of the analysis and because our interest in this paper is to explain: 
First, why certain tax initiatives are approved (rejected) by majority. Second, 
what is the role of the aggregation of preferences of the electoral competition 
and the majority rule in determining the tax policies chosen by parties and 
the initiatives that the median voter will support (reject). An extension of the 
type of tax instruments would complicate the analysis although it is likely to 
provide more insights on how preferences are aggregated by the two political 
institutions of interest of this paper. Future research might address these 
issues. 
 
Now we are ready to state Proposition 3 which characterizes the ideal tax 
system of the median voter. 
 
                                                 
22 To see this, note that the weighted average share of consumption on commodity i is 
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β α                                        (13) 
 
Proof 
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t t e x t R e t t Max
mv
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t ϕ ξ υ δ                   (14) 
 
Where 
mv δ    a constrained indirect utility of the median voter, and 
mv ξ  is the 
corresponding Lagrange multiplier of the public revenue constraint. The first 

















































,       0  
11 1
ϕ ϕ ξ
υ                 (15) 
 
























































,     0  







    
(16) 
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Proposition 4 A tax rate limit is approved by majority in the third stage of 
the game if 




















































































































t . By propositions (2) and (3), the former condition is 
satisfied when the following holds 
()















































































Proposition 4 says that there is no reason to think that the tax policies 
emerging from the electoral competition in a representative democracy with 
a probabilistic voting model will be equivalent to the tax policies that would 
arise in the political equilibrium for an economy that uses direct voting. 
While the tax structure in the electoral equilibrium of a representative 
democracy selects a tax system that represents the whole distribution of 
preferences and income of voters, the equilibrium of a direct voting economy 
aggregates the preferences and income of only the decisive (the median) 
voter.  
 
The main point of proposition 4 is to show the different dimensions that may 
explain why the electoral incentives of parties in the second stage of the 
game might lead to a tax structure that is different to the ideal tax system of 
the median voter. In other words, there are parametric values on the 








β α ϕ , the marginal 
probability that voters vote for party k, ( ) 0
hk f , the expected proportion of 
votes when the party relaxes the public budget constraint of the government, 
k ξ , the preferences and income of the median voter,  mv mv
i
mv e , ,β α , as well 
as the marginal disutility for the median voter when the government relaxes 
the public budget constraint of the government, 
mv ξ , that might guarantee 
the approval (rejection) of a tax rate limit. 
 
We should expect that a tax initiative would be approved by majority when 
the distribution of ideal taxes over commodity i  are asymmetric. In Ensayos 
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particular, when the distribution of ideal tax policies are skewed to the right 
condition (17) is likely to be satisfied because the tax on commodity i that 
maximizes the parties´ expected proportion of the votes could be higher than 
that desired by the median voter. The model of Downs (1957) of electoral 
competition under perfect information predicts that if the distribution of ideal 
taxes of citizens over the commodity i is symmetric then a tax rate initiative 
would not be approved (we say more about this below). In proposition 5 we 
identify conditions, related with the role of imperfect information of parties 
over the distribution of voter´s preferences for tax policy, in which a tax rate 
initiative can be approved even if the actual distribution of the ideal tax 
policies is symmetric. 
 
Proposition 5 Assume the actual distribution over ideal tax structures is 
symmetric. Assume further,
 
{ } k k c
c mv − = ∀ = ,    ξ ξ . In this case, a tax rate 





i i t t t
* < = { } k k c − = ∀ ,    is approved by majority in the 
third stage of the game. 
 
Proof 
By condition (17) in proposition 4, the condition that guarantees the approval 
of a tax rate initiative is satisfied when  
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By assumption the distribution of the ideal tax structures is symmetric. 
Therefore, the ideal tax policy of the median voter 
mv
i t
* is equivalent to the 
ideal tax policy of the average voter 
average
i t






* . The 
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e x t R ,e ,t t υ   Max
h
j i
t ϕ ξ ϕ δ  (18) 
 
Following the steps of proposition (3) and (4), it is simple to show that the 
ideal tax on commodity i for the average voter is  
 Political Institutions and Tax Rate Initiatives 
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By assumption  { } k k c
c mv − = ∀ = ,    ξ ξ , use condition (20) to show that 
(17) is 
 



















































                              
(21) 
 
Condition (18) is satisfied because  0 <  











h h e e β ϕ ξ β α ϕ , and
() { } 0 < 1   0 −
hk f   since  ( ) ( ) 1 , 0 0 ∈
hk f .  This proves that an initiative to limit 
the tax rate on commodity i will be approved by a majority in the third stage 
of the game. 
 
Proposition 5 characterizes the role of imperfect information in models of 
electoral competition in explaining why a tax rate initiative can be approved 
by majority. For an economy with direct and representative voting under 
perfect information on the distribution of voter´s preferences, it is satisfied 
that a tax rate initiative can never be approved by majority. In this case, the 
electoral competition in the second stage produces the ideal tax policy of the 
median voter.
23 Therefore, from the perspective of the median voter, the 
process of tax initiatives in the third stage of the game (or equivalently the 
direct voting over tax systems) can never improve upon the tax structure 
produced by the electoral competition in the second stage of the game. As a 
result, a tax rate initiative will never be approved by the median voter.  
                                                 
23 For an economy with perfect information and no abstentions to the vote, the electoral 
competition produces the median voter outcome for symmetric and asymmetric 




Our model identifies conditions in which a tax rate limit is approved by 
majority even if the actual distribution of preferences over taxes on 
commodity  i is symmetric. This result follows because the expected 
proportion of votes lost because of taxes in the electoral game under 
uncertainty is strictly lower than the proportion of votes lost in the electoral 
competition with perfect information. As a result, the probabilistic electoral 
equilibrium produces a tax rate on commodity i that is higher than that 
desired by the median voter. This, in turn, leads to the approval of a tax rate 
limitation in the third stage of the game in models of political competition 
under uncertainty. 
 
Another implication of our model is that imposing a tax rate initiative in the 
government is welfare increasing for the median voter relative the strategy of 
moving politicians out of office.
24 This result is explained as follows: in our 
economy, we have identified a set of parameters that can explain why the 
electoral competition might induce both parties to propose a policy that does 
not maximize the well being of the median voter. (recall that the parties´ tax 
policies converge, see proposition2). As a result, moving politicians out of 
office does not improve the utility of the median voter. The decisive voter is 
better off by imposing a tax rate limit that is welfare improving. This result 







The interest of this paper is to study how the interaction of two political 
institutions, the majority rule and the electoral competition, aggregates the 
preferences of voters, and how the process of preference aggregation affects 
the choices made by politicians over tax policy. By so doing we have used a 
simplified model that ignores, among other things, the choice of the 
instruments that can be limited by voters, and the communication of voters 
of their preferences to policy makers. 
 
On the former issue, a model that makes endogenous the choice of the tax 
instrument to be limited might provide further insights on the hypothesis that 
tax rate initiatives seek to change the distribution of tax prices while keeping 
the same level of spending by the government. An analysis along this line, 
                                                 
24 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this result. 
25 However, there are models that can rationalize the divergence of the parties´ policy 
proposals. In this case, it would be interesting to study the conditions in which the median 
voters is better off by approving a tax rate initiative relative the strategy of voting for a 
change in the administration of the government. Political Institutions and Tax Rate Initiatives 
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but in the context of a federation, might also mean that the voters of a 
jurisdiction might want to export the tax burden of the services of their 
government to other jurisdictions or might seek to change the existing 
arrangement of fiscal federalism (that is, voters might want to change the 
distribution of tax prices that citizens pay to the federal, state, and local 
government). 
 
On the latter issue, there is a literature that seeks to study the role of 
communication among economic agents see for instance the work on 
signaling by Banks and Sobel (1987) and on strategic information 
transmission by Austen-Smith (1990), and Kahn and Tsolulouhas (1999). 
However, there is little research on the impact of preference communication 
of voters and the approval (rejection) of tax initiatives. A paper that 
addresses one dimension of this issue is Ponce (2007) who studies the role of 
preference communication in explaining the rationale for tax initiatives and 
the effect of tax initiatives on the government´s behavior. In that paper I 
develop a model in which parties have imperfect information on the 
distribution of preferences over taxation, and voters communicate their 
preferences by voting over different choices of taxes. Parties observe how 
voters vote for different tax structures and update their system of beliefs on 
the distribution of voter´s preferences. 
 
In the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of that paper, a tax rate initiative not 
only constraints the choices over policy of the government but also modifies 
the objective to be maximized by the government. As mentioned before, 
after observing a tax rate limit, parties update their beliefs on how tax 
policies translate into votes. This in turn affects the way parties aggregate the 
voters’ preferences for tax policies in a way in which the resulting tax policy 
is more likely to receive the support of a stable majority. Moreover, the 
change in the way parties aggregates the voters’ preferences tends to 
accommodate the approval of the tax initiative. Hence, the model of Ponce 
(2007) suggests that governments with electoral constraints will not go 
against the sentiment expressed by voters through tax initiatives. This result 
explains the observed fact that tax initiatives are long lived (in general, the 




Finally it is important to assess the empirical relevance of the model. Even 
though the objective of the paper is to study the approval (rejection) of the 
voter´s tax initiatives in the U.S., our model can be applied to a broad set of 
economies. As mentioned before, the model studies the impact on tax design 
                                                 
26 For evidence that tax rate initiatives are long lived see the paper by the Advisory 
Commission of Intergovernmental Relations U.S. (1995). Ensayos 
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of the interaction between the direct voting for policies versus voting for 
representatives who design policies in behalf of voters. Therefore, our model 
is relevant to explain the design of fiscal policy in those countries in which 
tax and spending policies reflect the interaction between the executive and 
the legislative powers (that is to say, most of the economies in the world 
with majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems in which 
the electoral competition influences economic policy).
27 This model could 
also be useful to understand the effect of constitutional changes in the type 
of public policies that the government might adapt. Therefore, our analysis 
provides insights to those countries that are planning to make changes in 





In this paper we analyze the influence of the interaction between direct 
versus representative voting in determining tax policy. In a model of a 
representative democracy, we incorporate into the analysis of tax design the 
constitutional provision that allows voters to propose tax initiatives. In 
particular, we focus our attention on initiatives known as tax rate limits. The 
objective of the paper is to study why tax rate limits are placed on the ballot, 
and what explains the approval (rejection) of these initiatives.  
 
In this paper we provide a different rationale for the approval (rejection) of 
tax rate initiatives. Our model is different to the existing literature that 
focuses on how tax initiatives seek to control the size of government. In our 
model, the heterogeneity of voters´ preferences and income leads to conflicts 
among citizens about the distribution of tax burdens.  In our economy, a 
proposal for a TRL is placed on the ballot by a coalition of voters who seek 
to obtain a tax structure that is closer to their most preferred feasible policy 
(a coalition of voters wants to reduce their tax burden while they seek to 
maintain the tax revenue collections).  
 
We argue that a tax rate limit is likely to arise as a result of two institutions 
with different mechanisms to aggregate the voters’ preferences for tax 
policy. This might explain why a median voter might gain by approving a 
tax rate limit. It might also explain why tax initiatives are so prevalent across 
state and local governments in the U.S. In this paper we show that a TRL 
will be approved if the marginal rate of tax substitution of the decisive voter 
                                                 
27 This is so, because in these economies, fiscal policy reflects a bargaining process 
between the executive power, which responds to the electoral incentives of a general 
election (the first political institution of interest in this paper), and the legislative power 
which commonly uses the majority rule (the other political institution of interest) as a 
mechanism to achieve social choices. Political Institutions and Tax Rate Initiatives 
 
91 
(defined as the rate at which changes in the tax structure leads to a constant 
utility for the voter) is at least as high as the parties’ reaction functions (or 
changes in the non constrained tax instruments as a result of the approval of 
a TRL).  
 
Finally our paper distinguishes the role of perfect and imperfect information 
on the distribution of voters´ preferences for tax systems in approving a tax 
initiative. If parties design policies to win the election and have perfect 
information on the distribution of voters´ preferences for tax policy, then any 
tax rate initiative will be rejected by the median voter. In this paper we 
identify conditions in which the Downsian electoral competition under 
imperfect information on the distribution of voters´ preferences might lead to 
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